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This  paper  considers  the  problem of public  goods  as  an  example  of
non-Nash  behavior,  in which contributions  to  a  public  good are  a  function
expectations  concerning the  contributing  behavior of others  in  a well-
defined  group.  It  argues  (a) that  non-Nash behavior  is  an  empirically
plausible  foundation  for  the analysis  of  public  goods problems;  (b) that  the
influence  of  expectations affecting  this  behavior may be  described  in  terms
of  the  theory of  "conjectural  variations;"  (c) that  the  principal  difficulty
in achieving an  adequate  level  of  public  goods  is  due  to  the  "assurance
problem" in  cases  in  which conjectures  are  positive,  that  is,  when  agents
are uncertain whether a sufficient number of others will contribute  if  they
do.  This  framework  is  consistent with  recent work by Comes and Sandler
(1984a,  1984b) and encompasses  recent  arguments  by  Sugden  (1984) and  the
author  (Runge, 1981,  1984a,b).
The  paper is  divided  into  five  sections.  The  first  discusses  recent
literature on  public  goods  provision, and  the  importance  of expectations  and
non-Nash behavior as  a central argument  in  the  analysis of underprovision.
The  second  section describes a useful model of conjectural variation
allowing  analysis  of  expectations at  a  formal  level.  The  third  section
argues  that  the  assurance problem emerges  as  central  to  the  understanding of
both  successful and  unsuccessful public  goods provision.  The  fourth extends
the argument  developed in  section  two  to  consider issues  of group homogen-
eity and  provides  a definition of  "institutional  failure."  The  last  section
briefly  considers  an  important  instance  of these  problems:  common property.-2-
1.  Public Goods  and Economic Theory
Models  of  public goods  and collective action make  extensive use  of  the
Prisoner's Dilemma (PD),  in which  "free  riding"  dominates  regardless  of  the
expected decisions  of  others.  These models  predict  a Pareto-inferior Nash
equilibrium in which contributions are  less  than  the  level  that  would be
Pareto-optimal.  These models  are  increasingly unpersuasive  to  many econo-
mists,  primarily  because  they  fail the  empirical test  ordinarily required  of
positive scientific inquiry.  A wide and increasing body  of  experimental
results  fails  to  support  the  free  rider hypothesis and  the  impossibility of
voluntary public goods provision,  casting  "serious  doubt  upon  the  importance
- and, in  some  cases,  even upon the existence - of  the  free  rider problem"
(Kim and Walker, 1984,  p.  3).  These experimental  results  include those  in
which free riding is  less  than predicted, or what Brubaker  (1975,  1984)
terms  "weak" free  riding  (Smith, 1980;  Alfano and Marwell,  1981;  Marwell and
Ames,  1979,  19bU,  1981).  They  also include  results  in which no free
riding  occurs  at  all  (Bohm, 1972).  Responding in  part to  some  design
problems with these experiments, more  recent  experiments  have given stronger
support  to  the  free  rider hypothesis  (Isaac, McCue  and Plott,  1982;  Plott,
1982;  Kim and Walker, 1984).  Because  of  the wide  variation in these
results,  it would appear  that  additional  information is  necessary  to
understand when and why public goods  are  provided.  Neither strict  free
riding nor  complete  provision of  public goods are  universally observed
phenomena.
One  important  source  of  information concerns  the  expectations-held by-3-
agents  about the  likely behavior of  others.  Where  these expectations  affect
the  outcome, the  conjectures held  by  individuals about  others are  important
parameters.  These conjectures  may  be  either positive  (if  I expect  you  to
contribute, I will too)  or negative  (if  I expect  you  to  contribute, I
won't).  Positive and negative  conjectural variations  represent  non-Nash
behavior.  Nash behavior is a special case  in which  conjectural variations
are zero  (I'll contribute or  I won't,  regardless  of  what I expect  you  to  do).
The importance of  non-Nash  conjectures has  received  recent experimental
support.  In a series of  experiments testing  the  assumption of  Nash behavior
in a generalized bargaining situation, Roth and  Schoumaker  (1983)  report  the
failure of  models  based on such behavior  to  predict equilibrium outcomes. 1
These experiments  support  the hypothesis  that  bargaining is  based on expec-
tations  about  the contributing  behavior of  others,  implying non-zero conjec-
tures.  The conclusion of  the  experiments  is  that  "it  may  be necessary to
IThese may be  understood in  terms  of  the  following thought  experiment.  A
randomly  selected individual plays  a large number of  bargaining games over
how  to  divide a certain sum of  money with  an  opposing player.  Although  he
is  unaware  of  it,  all  of  his  opponents  are  confederates  of  the  experi-
menter, and  consistently  allow his  actions  to yield him, say, 80  percent
of  the available  money.  After  he  has gone  through  this  experience, you
have  an  opportunity to  bargain with him on your own  behalf  (not  as  a
confederate).  Since  his past  experiences  lead him to  expect  to  gain 80
percent  of  the money, he  has  every  reason to expect  that  you will concede
this  amount  to him.  The rules  of  the  game are  that  after completing a
set  of  negotiations,  the players  separately write down their  demands,
which they  receive if  their demands  are  compatible  (i.e.,  if their  conjec-
tures  are  consistent).  Otherwise  they receive nothing.  The fact  that  the
randomly  selected  individual tends  to  expect  to  receive  80  percent makes  it
risky for you  to write down a demand of  more than 20  percent.-4-
incorporate the  expectations  of  bargainers  into any  description of
equilibrium outcomes, and  that  there  may  in general  be  multiple equilibria
supported by different  sets  of  mutually  consistent  expectations"  (Roth and
Schoumaker,  1983,  p.  371).  This  result  is  consistent with more  specific
tests  of  the  free  rider hypothesis.  Isaac,  Walker  and Thomas  (1984),  for
example, determine  that  unique equilibria do  not  exist  in  public goods
situations  because  there  is  no  generally  dominant  strategy,  so  that  the  very
concept  of  free  riding is  poorly  defined.  They  therefore  conclude  (p. 141)
that  "Definitions and predictions  must  explicitly state  what  assumptions
about  expectations  and what  solution concepts  are  being employed."  In  yet
another experiment testing  the significance  of  expectations  in public goods
provision, Marwell and Ames  found  a statistically  significant relationship
between the  level of  contributions  to  public goods  expected of  others,  and
the  amount  contributed by  individual subjects  (1979,  p. 1356).  Fleishman,
in experiments similar  to  those  of  Marwell and Ames,  found that  "forming
expectations  of  others'  behavior does  influence  decisions  to  cooperate"
(1981,  p. 11).
These findings  are  remarkable  primarily  because  they  are explicitly
rejected in models based on Nash conjectures,  of  which the  most well known
is  the Prisoners'  Dilemma.  In  a number  of  earlier  papers  (Runge, 1981,
1982,  198 4a),  I have  argued that  the  concept  of  Nash  conjectures  and  the
Prisoners' Dilemma  are  therefore inappropriate  in most  public goods
situations,  and  argued in  favor  of  the  comparative plausibility  of  non-Nash
conjectures,  multiple equilibria, and  ttie  absence of  dominant  strategies.-5-
One consequence of  non-Nash behavior  is  to emphasize  the  distinction between
expectations  and actions.  For example,  if  I expect  my  neighbors  to  contri-
bute  to public radio or  television, does  this  lead  me  to  do  so  too,  or  does
it  lead me  not  to?  Is  there  some critical  mass  of  others who must  contri-
bute  for  me  to consider doing so  too?  (see Runge,  1985).
These issues  can be  considered in terms  of  three  types  of  relations
between expectations  and  actions.  The first  of  these  is  Nash behavior,  cap-
tured  by  the  dominant free  rider strategies  ot  the single-period PD  game.
The second type  is  represented  by  the  assurance problem, one in  a variety of
coordination games  (Schelling, 1960).  The assurance  problem (AP) does  not
predict  that public goods will always  be  provided  (Runge, 1981,  1982).  It
simply states  that  they can  be  if  expectations  are appropriately  structured.
Specifically,  the AP  holds  (1)  that  expectations  affect actions,  or  that
conjectures  are  non-Nash;  and  (2) that  these conjectures  are positive,  so
that  expectations are  positively correlated with actions.  Hence,  if  I
expect  others  to  contribute to  a public good,  I will contribute too;  but  if
I expect  others  to  free  ride,  I will  free ride  too.  The  single  period PD,
in contrast, holds  that  it  does  not matter what I expect  of  others;  I will
always free  ride.  The  "iterated"  PD introduces  expectations  by  repeating
the PD  game.  As  Axelrod and Hamilton  (1981)  and  various others  have  shown,
the iterated  PD  leads  to  equilibrium strategies which, while unstable, are
most  robust when agents  pursue a  "tit-for-tat" strategy.  This  strategy
reflects positive  conjectural variations,  since expectations  of  next-period
contribution lead to  contribution, while expectations  of  next-period defec-Table  1
CONJECTURES
NEGATIVE  CONJECTURES  ZERO CONJECTURES  POSITIVE CONJECTURES
Defection  If  I expect contri-  I will  defect,  If  I expect  defection,
bution, I will defect  regardless  of what  I will  defect
(conjectural  free  I expect  of  others
riding)  (dominant free
riding)
SINGLE  PERIOD
PRISONERS DILEMMA
STRATEGIES
ASSURANCE PROBLEM
ITERATED PRISONERS'
DILEMMA
Contribution  If  I expect  I will  contribute,  If I expect  contri-
defection,  I will  regardless  of what  bution,  I will
contribute  (conjec-  I expect of others  contribute
tural  altruism)  (dominant
contribution)
II  [  I[
CONFLICTING  INDEPENDENT  COORDINATED
STRATEGIES  STRATEGIES  STRATEGIES-6-
tion lead  to defection.  A third category  of  game  involves  negative conjec-
tures, which are  often erroneously associated with  the Nash  conjectures  of
the single period PD.  Negative  conjectures  imply  a negative  correlation
between expectations  and  actions.  If  I expect  others  to  contribute,  then I
will  free  ride,  if I expect  others  to  free  ride,  then I will contribute.
We  can think  of  expectations  determining actions  in terms  of  conflict
and coordination:  negative conjectures  imply  actions  that  purposively
conflict;  positive conjectures  imply  actions  that  purposively  are  coor-
dinated.  Zero conjectures  imply  that  expectations  simply  do  not  influence
actions;  they  are  independent  (see Table  1).  Whether  the structure of
expectations  in a given situation is  that  of  positive, negative,  or  zero
conjectures  is  an empirical question.  In  order  to develop adequate  tests,  a
more  precise analytical framework  is necessary.  This  framework has  recently
been developed in  a series of  important  papers.
2.  Models  of  Conjectural Variation
Nash  behavior, or  zero  conjectural variations,  assume that  contribu-
tions  to  the public good are  independent of  the expected  contributions ot
others.  Non-Nash behavior may  take  the  form of  either  positive  or  negative
conjectural variations,  in which expectations  determine  individual contribu-
tions.  A relatively  simple graphical technique  following Comes and  Sandler
(1984a)  may  be  used  to  describe non-Nash  behavior, thus  illustrating  a
number of  important  issues  discussed above.
Comes and  Sandler's  description  is  as  follows.  Suppose  that  n indivi--7-
duals constitute a well-defined group  consuming a pure  public good  and a
private good.  The  ith  consumer has  a continuous,  strictly increasing and
strictly quasiconcave utility  function
(1)  U = U(y, Q + q)
where y is  consumption of  the  private  good, q is the  quantity  of  the  pure
public good  purchased and Q is  the purchase  of  the public good  by  the  rest
of  the group.  The  individual consumes  both his  own  purchases  of  the  public
good and those of  others so  that  Q + q = Q.  This  "total" consumption  results
from nonrivalry and nonexcludability  due  to  the  good's  pure public nature
(Samuelson, 1954).  Where  the  public good  is  not  pure,  the  level of  consump-
tion of  Q  will decrease for  the consumer  to  the  extent  that  rivalry or
excludability exist.  The ith  consumer maximizes  utility subject  to  a budget
constraint:
(2)  y + pq = I
where the price of  the  numeraire private good  is 1, the public good's
price  is p, and  the individual's  income  is  I.  Equations  (1) and  (2) imply
(3)  U = U(I  - pq,  Q + q).
If I and p are fixed,  this  function  in turn  implies  the existence of
indifference curves  for  various  levels  of  q and Q.  Expressed  in  (q,  Q)
space,  these  curves  are  a two dimensional representation  of  the  three-
dimensional indifference  surface expressed by  levels  of  y, q, and Q.  If
this  two-dimensional plane cuts  this  space in  the  yq  orthant, where y + pq  = I
and is  parallel  to  the Q axis  at  a height  of  I in  the  yQ  orthant  and  a
I  orthant, the procedure eliminates the numeraire
height  of - in  the qQ  orthant,  the  procedure  eliminates the  numeraire
P-a-
from consideration and  the  trade-off  between q and Q  can  be  displayed  in
two-dimensional  (q, Q) space.
In  the  figure  below, three  such indifference  curves  are pictured.
Their shape reflects  the well-behaved nature  of  the utility  functions.
Monotonicity,  for example, insures  that  I2  lies  above  I1,  and  13  above I2.
Hence, for  a given level  of  q, added measures  of  the public good Q due  to
the  decisions of  others  increases utility  overall.  The  slope of  an
indifference curve is
(4)  P  -
MKSQ
where NKSy is  the marginal  rate of  substitution  between total public good
consumption  (Q + q) = Q  and  the private good.  This  is  because
(5)  U = U(I  - pq,  Q + q)
au  au  au (6)  =-p y +
and
(7)  au  au (7)
aQ  aQ
Dividing (6) by  (7) and simplifying yields  (4).
Where P/MRSQ  is  equal to  1,  and  the  slope  is  therefore  zero,  the  curve
reaches  an interior minimum.  The utility-maximization problem leading  to
the minimizing choice  is  subject  to  both the  budget  constraint  and  the
constancy  of  Q.  This  implies Nash  conjectures,  or  zero  conjectural
variation,  in  the  sense that  the  individual views  the public  goods  contribu-
tions  of  others  as  independent of  how much he contributes himself  (q) or  the
consumption of  private good  (y).  Hence,  with Nash conjectures,Figure  1
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(8)  d  =  0.
dq
A  reaction path consistent with Nash conjectures  is  traced  out along  the
minima of  these  indifference  curves, where MRSQy  = p,  or NN  (which may  be
either positively  or  negatively  sloped).  If  the  "rest  of  the  group" is  only
one person, then we  can  describe another indifference  curve  in  the same
space,  such as  ii, which yields  a locus  of  minima such as  nn, which inter-
sects at  point N*,  the Nash equilibrium.  Stability  requires  that  the abso-
lute value of  the product  of  the  two  paths be  less  than 1 in  the  neigh-
borhood of  equilibrium  (see Comes and Sandler,  1984b).  The  tangencies  of
the  two  agent's indifference  curves,  such as  point  P*,  trace out  the  Pareto
optimal path PP.  Along  this  path,  the sum  of  MRS's  is  equal to  the  price
ratio or marginal  rate of  transformation.  In  cases  of  more than  two  indivi-
duals,  a "representative individual"  may  be  described  by assuming that  indi-
viduals  hold the  same  tastes  and  endowments and  that  the Nash symmetric
equilibrium results where each  is  behaving identically.
Non-Nash behavior in  the public goods model  occurs  when
(9)  a  U
dq
where Q  is  the  value  of  Q  that  is  expected  to  occur.  As  noted above,  an
agent  may  expect  that  his  own contribution will  have either a positive  or
negative influence  on  the  expectations of  the  group.  In  general, the  larger
the  group, the smaller  the  individual share - - ---  would  be.  In  those
(q + Q)
cases where n  is  large,  an argument can  be  made  for  small effects  of  conjec-
tural variations  expressed by  (9).  This  is  Olson's  (1965)  classic  argu--10-
ment.  The conjectural variation captured by  (9)  expresses  the  effect of
changes  in an  individual's contribution on  the expected  contributions of
others.  Equally important  may  be  the  effect  of  the  expected contributions
of  others  on  the individual,  or  q  -.  Even in  large groups,  the  expectation
dQe
that  contributions will be  made  by  others may  lead  to  increased  individual
contributions if  conjectures  are  positive,  and decreased contributions  if
conjectures are  negative.
In general, individual contributions will  thus depend not  only  on  the
conjectures of  agents,  but  on parameters that  affect these  conjectures,  such
as  group size,  the costs  of  monitoring  individual contributions,  enforcement
capacity,  reputation, and  other arguments.  Below, I shall  argue  that  these
parameters are determined  largely  by  social  institutions, which are inno-
vated so  as  to  affect  the conjectures  of  individual  agents.  Comes and
Sandier propose the  general specification
(1U)  d- = F(6,  q), dq
where 0 is  a vector of  parameters  including  influences  on  the  responsiveness
of  individuals  to  the expected behavior of  others.  Following  the argument
above, we will also be  interested in  the  impact  of  the  group on  individual
behavior, expressable as
(11)  dq  = G(,  Qe)
In  general, we can  express  Qe  as  endogenous,  so  that
(12)  Qe = F(9,  q, K)
where K is  a constant  of  integration  (see Comes and  Sandler,  198 4a,-11-
equation (4) and  (5)).  Similarly,
(13)  q = G(6,  Qe,  K).
In  both cases, K  is  dependent  on  initial conditions.  In  (12),  these are
given by  the  initial  value of  Q,  and in  (13)  by  the  initial  value of  q.
This ingenious  representation can  accommodate  any function, allowing
description of  conjectural variations using  "expectations contours"  in  (q,Q)
space.  This  assumes  that  the current  level  of expectations  is  given
exogenously,  expressed in  current values  of  Q and q, and does  not  depend on
any other endogenous variables.  One way  to  interpret  this  is  as  a short-run
condition.  In  the short  run,  expectations  of  the behavior  of  others  are
"given" by  the  rules  in force.  In the  long  run,  these  rules,  and  therefore
the  vector parameters e, may  change  as  new institutional arrangements  are
innovated.
Derivation of  equilibrium  in  a non-Nash  setting proceeds  by  substituting
Q  for Q in the individual's utility  function,  because  the  agent's  contribu-
tions  depend on  his  expectations.  Substituting  (12)  for Q  in  (3) results
in  the  problem of  the  effects  of  individual  contributions  on  the  group's
expected contributions.
Max U(y,  F(  ,  q, K) + q)
Y,q
st.  I = y + pq
In this  case first order  conditions simplify  to
(14)  [(aF/3q)  + 1JMRS  = p
Qy-12-
The solution to  this  problem takes  the  form of  q*, which  is  a function of
Qe.  Hence, not  only  do  individual contributions  affect  expectations  of  the
group,  these expectations  affect  individual contributions.  This  result  re-
duces  to  that of  Nash when dQe/dq = 0 which will  also  imply  that  dq/dQe = 0.
Otherwise, the conjectural  variation serves  as  an additive weighting factor
that  affects optimal  behavior.  Expectations,  in  other words,  determine
optimal  actions.2
In  the figure,  curves K1Qe,  K2Qe and K3Qe  represent  different  expec-
tations paths,  each different by  a constant.  These  correspond  to  (12)  but
with different  initial conditions  established  by  the  level of  public goods
contributions Q provided  by  others  in  the group.  The  slopes of  these
functions  are  conjectural variations  dQe/dq.  Where  the  slope of  expectations
paths  is  positive, positive conjectures  are  described, and an increase in q
is  expected to increase Q.  Where  the  slope  is  negative, negative con-
jectures  are described.  These  conjectures provide  a constraint  binding  the
contribution of  the individual  for  the  public good.
Positive conjectures  lead  to  a hybrid reaction path, HH, which is the
locus of  tangencies  of  the  indifference  curves  and  the expectations  paths.
This  can  be  seen by  rearranging  (14)  so  that
(15)  aF/3q = p/MRS  - 1
The left  hand side  is  the slope  of  the  expectations  path of  Q and  the  right
hand  side  is  the slope of  the  indifference  curve,  so  HH  is  the path charac-
2Second order conditions,  of  course,  must  also  be  satisfied.  Comes and
Sandler  (1984a, p. 375)  note  that  second order  conditions  require  that
expectations  contours  have  less  curvature than  the  indifference contours
in  the neighborhood of  the  point  of  frequence.-13-
terized by  the  optimality conditions  in  (14).
It  is  important  to  note  that  the hybrid  reaction path  resulting from
positive  conjectures  characterizes a situation in which increased  individual
contributions  are matched by  increased contributions  by  others  (though  not
necessarily  in  the  same proportion).  Wherever  this  is  the  case,  the  hybrid
path  shows that  a dollar's worth of  contributions  return more  than a
dollar's worth of  public goods.  Hence,  it  is  not  surprising  that with posi-
tive  conjectures,  HH always  lies  to  the  right  of  NN,  and  closer  to  the
Pareto path PP.  It  is  also clear that with negative  conjectures,  expec-
tations  contours are  negative,  and  the locus  of  tangencies  with the  indif-
ference curves will fall  to  the  left  of  the  Nash path, and  therefore  even
further from  the Pareto  path then either NN  or HH.  The implication  of  this
model  is  that  individuals  have an  incentive  to supply more  of  the  public
good  if  they  expect  the  rest  of  the group  to do  so  too.  This  incentive  for
coordinated behavior  is  fundamental  to  the appeal  of  the assurance problem
as  an analytical  description of  the  problem of  public goods  provision.
3.  The Assurance Problem
The incentive  for  coordinated action,  reflected  by  the  Pareto
superiority  of  positive  conjectural variations  in  the Comes and Sandler
framework,  is  also  central to  other recent  work on  voluntary public  goods
provision.  Sugden  (1982,  1984)  has  argued explicitly  that  a desire  for
coordination may  explain such behavior.  Individuals  pursue  self-interest
subject  to  rules which  it  is  in  everyone's  interest  that  everyone should
follow  (see  also, Liebenstein,  1984).  If  an  individual expects  others  to
contribute  at  least Q,  for  example,  then he  might  feel obliged  to  contribute-14-
some minimal  amount,  say Q.  This  type  of  rule  is  often called  "Kantian"
(Collard, 1983),  implying a moral foundation for public  goods contributions.
Harsanyi (1980)  has  given it  the  more  revealing  title of  "rational
commitment."  This  is  appropriate,  because it  is  unclear  that  there  is  any
moral content  to  the  decision except  that  it  is  constrained  by  expectations
of  others'  behavior.  Sugden (1984)  refers  to  this  simple rule  as  the
"principle  of  reciprocity,"  in which individuals  commit  themselves  to  a cer-
tain level  of public goods  contribution, conditional  on  the expectations
that  others will do  the  same.  In  Sudgen's  model,  reciprocity  appears  to  be
simply a manifestation of  positive non-Nash conjectures,  since decisions  to
contribute are conditional  on  the  expectation  that  others will do  so  too.
Consistent with  the framework above, Sugden finds  that  in  a  simple
model  based on reciprocity,  an equilibrium  level of  public goods  contribu-
tion exists,  but  is  not  generally unigue,  because the  particular equilibrium
depends  on expectations of  reciprocation.  Moreover, the  set  of  attainable
equilibria includes  the Pareto efficient  one,  but  other equilibria involve
under-provision  of  the public good.  As  Sugden notes  (1984,  p.  788),  "These
inefficient equilibrium states  are ones  in which everyone would contribute
more  if  only  he  know  that  the  others would  too,  but  in which  no  one will
make the  first move.  They are  instances  of  the  'assurance problem'  (Sen,
19b7)  as opposed to  the  n-person  prisoner's dilemma problem."
It  is worth emphasizing that  the assurance problem reflects  a set  of
preferences  in which agents prefer  to  coordinate their  behavior.  If  they
expect  free riding  by  others,  they prefer  to  free ride,  but  if  they  expect-15-
contribution by  others,  they prefer to  contribute  (Runge,  1984a).  Nothing
is  implied concerning the optimality  of  actions, which depends  on  the struc-
ture  of  expectations  at  the point  at  which the  choice  is  made.  As  Sugden's
language suggests,  everyone would contribute more  "if  only he knew that  the
other would too."
This implies  that  the particular structure  of  expectations  reflected
by  Q  in  the model  above  is  in general uncertain.  A probability  distribu-
tion of  conjectures  faces  the agent,  so  that he  is  uncertain what  level  of
contribution to  expect  from others.  Hence,  any information concerning  this
likelihood has value.  This  information set  determines  the predictability of
others'  contributions.  It  is  relatively easy  to  see  that  rules  or  institu-
tions which can  increase this  predictability and  inform expectations will
coordinate individual  choice.  If  the  coordination of  these expectations
leads  to  a Pareto-superior allocation, as  in  the Comes and Sandler  fra-
mework, then the incentive  to  innovate institutions  to accomplish this  coor-
dination  is  clear.  The demand for  rules  and  institutions  is  thus  a demand
for  assurance  respecting  the  likely  behavior  of  others  (Runge,  1984b) or
what Heiner (1983)  has  called  simply  "predictable  behavior."
I  believe that  the incentive  for  coordinated choice  lends a strong
plausibility  to  the assurance  problem as  a model  of  public  goods provision,
because it  is  capable  of  explaining both undersupply and  increasing  incre-
ments  of  voluntarily provided  public goods, based on alternative specifica-
tions  of  expectations determined  by  the  institutional rules  in force.  In
this sense, it  is  consistent with  the wide  range  of  experimental findings-16-
reported above.  Institutional rules  in force  set parameters on  individual
expectations,  resulting  in alternative  levels  of  public  goods provision.  In
a dynamic setting, they  inform the  prior distribution  of  a Bayesian  sequence
of  decisions  (Runge, 1984 a).  In  the  short run,  the  institutional  setup is
fixed.  In  the longer  run, incentives will exist  to  further  coordinate
expectations  (subject to transactions  costs),  leading  to Pareto-superior
allocations.
In the Comes and  Sandler framework,  the  particular manner in  which
expectations are  formed is  outside  of  the model.  However, if expectations
are modeled as  probability distributions defined  over  the contributing beha-
vior of  others,  so  that  the institutions  enter  as  variables  affecting  the
parameters of  these distributions  (Runge,  198 4a),  the  choice of  institutions
can be modeled as  an endogenous response  to  the  assurance problem.
Reductions  in  the variance of  a distribution of  conjectured  public goods
provided by  others  can  then be used  as  a measure  of  assurance.
Where expectations  are  rational,  in  the  sense  of  Muth  (1961),  agents
hold  the  relevant  and correct  theory  allowing predictions  of  others  agents'
actions, and  the uncertainty  giving rise  to  the  assurance problem is  not  a
problem.  We may  therefore  equate  "perfect"  institutions  with the  relevant,
correct  theory allowing  "rational"  expectations  leading  to a Pareto-optimal
outcome.  These  institutions  provide forecasts  of  the  behavior  of  others
that  are,  on average,  both accurate and  conducive to Pareto  optimality.
However, because individuals  are  in general unable  to  rely on  the  relevant
correct theory,  norms,  conventions and  institutions  are  innovated that  can-17-
provide information concerning the average opinion,  or  what  Frydman has
called a "consensus  condition" (Frydman, 1982).  This  condition provides  the
assurance  necessary  for coordinated choice,  and  may  be  described as  arising
from institutional innovations emerging endogenously  from the  problem of
public goods.
4.  Group Homogeneity and  "Institutional Failure"
An important  issue arising  from the analytical  framework  developed
above  concerns  the issue of  group homogeneity.  In  the Comes and Sandler
framework,  a "representative"  individual is achieved  by  treating tastes  and
endowments as  identical.  In Sugden's  (1984)  model, identical  individuals
are a special case.  In  Sugden's more general  case, underprovision  of  the
public good will generally be  an equilibrium where heterogeneous  tastes  and
endowments are present,  but will  converge on Pareto-optimality  as  tastes  and
endowments become  more homogeneous.  Sugden therefore  argues  that  the  more
homogeneous a group's  tastes  and endowments,  the  more  likely  the  coor-
dination of positive  conjectures  becomes.  The more heterogeneous  a group,
the more  likely  is  underprovision.  Of  course,  heterogeneity  of  tastes  and
endowments also generally  increases with group size, although  it  need not.
Group size per  se may  be  a misleading  indicator of  the capacity  for  volun-
tary  public goods provision if  the  group  is relatively  homogeneous  (see
Runge, 1981;  Frohlich and Oppenheimer,  1970).
Regardless of  group homogeneity,  the assurance problem remains  an  issue
as  long as  the  particular contribution of  agents  is  conditional  on expec--18-
tations, and  these  expectations  are  uncertain.  As  Sugden (1984,  p.  781)
observes:
Even  for a society of  identical individuals,  the  theory  of
reciprocity  does  not  predict  that  the  free-rider problem
will be  solved.  Because of  the assurance problem, a society
of moral citizens  can get  locked  into  an  equilibrium in
which no  one  contributes anything  towards a public good  -
even though everyone would prefer  that  everyone contributed.
The theory  says  only  that  the  free ride  problem  can be
solved.
Hence a framework based on positive  conjectures and  the assurance problem  is
consistent with  a variety of  levels  of  public goods  contributions, depending
on whether coordination or  "consensus" has  been  achieved.  The assurance
problem is  thus more  fundamental  than  the issue of  group  homogeneity, and
concerns  the capacity  of  any group, even  a set  of  agents  with  identical
tastes and endowments,  to  coordinate expectations  and  actions.
The inability of  any  group  to  solve  the  assurance problem represents a
form of  "institutional failure."  This  inability will be  exacerbated  by
heterogeneous  tastes  and  endowments,  but  the  potential  for underprovision
even in a group of  identical agents  will remain.  The absence of  institu-
tions  capable of  providing consensus  may  be  considered analogous  to  a
"missing market"  in  the  analysis  of  market  failure.  Indeed, since  markets
are  simply  a subset  of  the  set  of  rules  that  coordinate individual choice,  I
would argue that  market  failure  is  in actuality  a subset  of  institutional
failure, and  that  both are  manifestations  of  a lack  of  information allowing
for  coordinated individual choice  (see Dahlman,  1979).  The concept  of-19-
"missing institutions,"  united with a theory  of  "missing markets,"  is  an
important  line  of  theoretical inquiry  that  can provide  a new basis  for
institutional economics.
5.  The Case of  Common Property
A representative  issue  in  the  public goods  literature  is  the  commons
problem (see Dasgupta,  1982).  While a full model  of  the  commons  along  the
lines developed above  is  beyond  the  scope of  this  paper,  it  may  be  useful to
draw together  the implications  of  this  line  of  inquiry for  commons problems.
Comes and Sandler (1983)  have  applied an earlier version of  their model  to
the  commons,  but  their  conclusions depend  on assumptions  of  zero  fixed  costs
and no barriers  to  entry,  making  the  analysis  more pertinent  to  problems  of
open access  than common property  (Ciriacy-Wantrup and  Bishop,  1975).  In
such a situation of  open access,  they  show that  consistent  conjectural
equilibrium loads  to overexploitation of  the  resource  regardless  of  the
number of  agents  using it.  This  overexploitative behavior is  made worse by
positive conjectures, which reinforce  each agent's  expectations  that  others
are extracting  rents,  so  that  profits  are eventually driven  to  zero.  This
result is  consistent with what we know of  open access,  but not  necessarily
with what  we know  of  common  property.
In situations  of  common property, as  distinct  from open access,  it  is
the  function of  institutional  agreements  to  impose both  fixed costs  and
barriers  to  entry  to  those outside the group.  A  variety of  forms  of  moni-
toring,  enforcement or  other  costs  and  controls  affect expectations where-20-
common property exists,  represented by  0  in  the framework developed above.
In these  situations, the  particular impact  of  institutional  rules,  and  the
set  of  incentives  they provide, will  determine  the structure  of  expectations
held by  individual members of  the group.  If  institutions  fail  to  coordinate
these  expectations,  this  institutional failure will  be  manifest  in  increased
overexploitation of  the resource,  and  the  situation will approach  that  of
open access.  Where property  institutions  are  not  failing, the assurance
problem is  being confronted, individual uncertainty is  reduced,  and  consen-
sus  allows  coordination of  individual use  of  the  common  resource.
The ability  to  coordinate this  behavior,  solving  the assurance problem,
may  be  more difficult  where tastes  and  endowments  are  less  homogeneous,
especially where  the group  is  large.  Hence,  traditional  or  highly homoge-
neous  societies may  require fewer  forms  of  monitoring or  enforcement  to
achieve Pareto-improvements in  common use  of  resources,  even if  the group
involved is  large, as  long as  the  existing structure  of  institutions  allows
for  consensus.  Where  this  consensus  is  absent,  an  assurance problem arises
that must  be confronted either  by  the  endogenous  innovation of  institutions
capable of  solving  it,  or  by  the  imposition of  exogenous  rules,  monitored
and enforced so as  to  reduce  the  level  of  uncertainty  and stabilize  expec-
tations  of  others'  behavior.  The  relative cost  of  the  former and latter
strategy, especially  in  the  context  of  Third World  resource management,  is
an important  focus  for  future  research in the  new institutional economics  of
public goods provision.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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